Articles

A UN Dividend for Turkmenistan 1st February 2008

Alex Jackson asks what the opening of a UN office in Ashgabat means for Turkmenistan and the region.

The establishment on December 10 of a new regional UN mission in Ashgabat was greeted with the encouraging, if somewhat bland, platitudes that we’ve come to expect from the world body.

Should we have high hopes for the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA)? Perhaps not; but the centre is still a significant step in President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov’s ongoing effort to portray Turkmenistan as an engaged, productive member of the international community.

UNRCCA is designed as a platform for regional dialogue and co-operation, both with Central Asian governments and with regional bodies like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Lynn Pascoe, the UN under-secretary general for political affairs, representing Ban-Ki Moon at the opening ceremony, hoped that the centre would address the perennial challenges of Central Asia - “from extremism and terrorism to drug trafficking and environmental challenges” - as well as acting as a more general forum for states to air their differences before conflict starts.

Whether it can do much more than this, given that many regional initiatives in Central Asia have either failed completely or simply stalled, remains to be seen. The significance of the centre probably lies not in what it plans to achieve but more in the time of its opening and its location.

Berdymukhammedov cannot claim too much credit for the decision to locate UNRCCA in Ashgabat, given that the idea was discussed as long ago as 2004 and that the UN had more or less confirmed the centre’s location before he came to power at the end of 2006.

What he can do, which his predecessor Saparmurat Niyazov could not, is to use the establishment of UNRCCA as a symbol for his policy of “opening up” Turkmenistan to the outside world. Indeed, this sentiment was expressed at the opening ceremony by the heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the SCO.

In recent months, Berdymukhammedov has engaged in constructive dialogue with the EU on trade and energy issues (his predecessor’s relationship with Europe was, one analyst notes dryly, “rather inert”). Similar talks have taken place with US officials, whilst Berdymukhammedov hosted a meeting of CIS heads in November and attended the SCO summit in August (though as an honorary guest, since Turkmenistan is not a formal member). Warmer ties with Presidents Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan have developed under Berdymukhammedov, and he also flattered the UN itself at the General Assembly meeting in September by declaring that it has, and will continue to be, the cornerstone of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy.

The picture that emerges from this energetic diplomacy is of a country becoming more integrated into both regional frameworks and the international community. The reason, as so often in Central Asia, is energy resources. For Europe, China, Russia and the other Central Asian states, the recent “opening up” is a golden opportunity to invest in, and reap the rewards from, Turkmenistan’s huge gas fields. For Berdymukhammedov, as with other leaders in recent years, energy supplies can be a crucial geopolitical tool.

Pascoe has announced that, unless asked, UNRCCA will not focus on energy politics, perhaps appreciating that the issue is too tangled up with geopolitical currents that the UN cannot easily affect. Nonetheless, the UN presence in Turkmenistan will raise the country’s international profile, and act as a seal of approval from the UN. This will, in turn, bolster foreign engagement with Berdymukhammedov and his energy riches.

Should we see the establishment of UNRCCA, a sign of Turkmenistan’s rapprochement with the wider world, as a shift away from Turkmenistan’s stance of “permanent neutrality” granted by the UN in 1995?

Probably not. Instead, it’s better viewed as a vindication of that position. Turkmenistan was chosen as a site for the centre, as UN envoy to the region Vladimir Goryaev made clear in July, because of its past record of neutrality and of impartiality. It would be a little harder to imagine, say, Uzbekistan being chosen as the site of a conflict prevention centre, given its past sabre-rattling towards Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Berdymukhammedov’s Turkmenistan seems to want to remain impartial whilst still being engaged.

The more pressing question is whether or not UNRCCA can succeed in its plans to deal with Central Asia’s thorniest problems. Terrorism, separatism, cross-border smuggling of drugs and weapons and disputes over borders and water have been problems for the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some of them, such as terrorism, have a lot to do with continued problems in Afghanistan, which is something that the UN mission will have very little influence over. If the centre fails to make progress on addressing issues such as water distribution, which are within its scope, then the image of both the UN and Turkmenistan itself will be tarnished.

However, provided UNRCCA manages to provide a healthy and effective forum for regional debate, one fully plugged into the UN’s development, diplomatic and peacekeeping apparatus, and that Turkmenistan itself as the host nation attaches sufficient importance to the centre’s endeavours, then Berdymukhammedov’s image as an international statesmen can only be boosted.

Nevertheless, any diplomatic grandstanding on his part would have limits. The prime mover behind the centre’s establishment was, after all, his predecessor, and the UN diplomat in charge (whose identity has not yet been confirmed) will be more crucial in resolving any conflicts than the president of the host nation. One should not, therefore, expect too much of a boost to Turkmenistan’s international standing. A higher profile in the Central Asian region is the most likely result, though this itself will depend on Berdymukhammedov keeping up his cordial ties with the SCO and with his neighbours. And, as discussed above, the centre will undoubtedly be an encouraging sign to foreign companies who may until now have been cautious to invest in a country with a relatively untested new leader and a history of authoritarianism and isolation.

Although the practical impact of the centre - on both Turkmenistan’s international standing and the problems of the region - may be limited, this should not detract from its importance as a symbol of the country’s “new direction” under Berdymukhammedov. Perception is an important factor in international diplomacy, and the presence of a UN mission on Turkmen soil can, and should, be perceived as a sign that the country is now fully accepted into the international community. Where Berdymukhammedov goes from here remains to be seen. But for him, and for Central Asia, the UN centre is an encouraging sign.

Alex Jackson is a postgraduate student of War Studies at King’s College London, with a focus on security and political issues in Central Asia.

Clean Hands: Tajikistan’s Fight Against Corruption 14th September 2007

Poverty and clan loyalty are at the root of corruption in Tajikistan. Livia Paggi examines the issues.

It appears that Tajikistan is finally beginning to tackle one of the biggest obstacles to its economic development – corruption. In May the government said it was willing to sign the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In mid-August, an agency made up of senior government officials and representatives from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) held its first meeting in Dushanbe to implement a national anti-corruption strategy. From an outsider’s perspective, this looks like a big step forward for Tajikistan, which is the poorest post-Soviet state.

But the reality is that corruption is a complex problem engrained at all levels of Tajik society and, crucially, in the clan system by which it is organized. Corruption can also be seen as the symptom of a country recovering from a civil war that fragmented it along regional lines, one which is also struggling with the remnants of a decayed soviet system. Both factors are self-reinforcing. Simply engaging with western international organizations’ rhetoric and ticking the anti-corruption boxes may not be enough for Tajikistan to come clean.

Why Western development agencies fund anti-corruption projects

Over the past five years, international organizations and financial institutions such as the Swedish International Development Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank have stated that corruption is the biggest obstacle to Central Asian states’ transition to democracy and the free market. In a recent report USAID said “nothing does more to alienate citizens from their political leaders and institutions and to undermine stability and economic development than endemic corruption”. There is the shared belief that corruption distorts the rules of free trade, deters foreign investors, and increases the risk of firms “capturing” the state.

The effects of corruption harm the overall wellbeing of Tajik citizens, but what is more worrisome for the West is the fact that this environment creates unpredictable risks as they try to establish political and economic relations. As a result of this line of thinking, Tajikistan has received just over $1m in foreign assistance for a two year anti-corruption project to be implemented by UNDP.

This should be positive news for Tajikistan, considering that the country is ranked 142 out of 159 on Transparency International’s corruption perception index. However, there’s a question over whether the local perception of how corruption operates can be reconciled with that of the international community. The head of the newly established Anti-Corruption Agency, Sherhon Salimov, has developed a strategy that targets ordinary civilians as well as institutions. He claims that members of the Agency will meet weekly and be “a key instrument to invent an all-embracing anti-corruption strategy”. His hope is that the “initiative will garner public support”.

Defining corruption in Tajikistan

In fact, corruption is deeply embedded in everyday social interactions in Tajikistan. A survey conducted this year by the Dushanbe based Strategic Research Center listed some of the euphemisms used in everyday life to ask for bribes – they include inviting someone for pilav (the national dish), offering a cup of tea or sweets, or saying “some wheels need to be greased”. The pervasiveness of corruption means that it’s readily interpretable even by the youngest members of society. For a UN sponsored art competition, children were asked to draw how they saw corruption. They drew people paying off militia who had waved down a car, paying school teachers in order to attend lessons, paying doctors. The common theme was clear: if you can afford to pay bribes you have access to all basic services, including electricity. If you can’t you’re left with nothing.

Although corruption has become a commonly accepted, Tajik citizens see it as a real problem. There should, then, be support for efforts to eliminate it and more importantly eliminate the problems that force people to resort to corruption – mainly low salaries and a lack of state-provided services.

Unfortunately, the issue of bribery and corruption becomes more complex when clan loyalties are brought into the equation. Services and jobs are often given to individuals simply because they are from the same region or clan. Clan politics has always dominated Tajikistan’s power system and this way of operating has been greatly reinforced since the civil war and the collapse of the Soviet economy. The objective of clan politics is to constantly appropriate and distribute all resources (money, access to education and so on) and concentrate the wealth in the hand of ‘family’ in the extended sense. Central Asian states have a long historical tradition of clan ties which not even the Soviet system could eliminate. It is no secret that the current government of President Emomali Rakhmon has systematically replaced old officials with new ones from his own clan. In fact, several government officials even share his last name.

Although international organizations in Tajikistan are aware that hiring decisions are often made based on regional connections there is very little that they have been able to do to prevent this. Some of the biggest corruption scandals have taken place inside the US embassy in Tajikistan. In Dushanbe, when having conversations with officials about international organizations it is not uncommon to hear generalisations about local staff employed at the US embassy being predominantly from the Khujand clan or UNDP staff coming from the Pamir region. It is hard to say whether this is true or not as the evidence is anecdotal. However, it does point to the fact that when citizens assess resources and potential opportunities, they often identify themselves in terms of clan networks.

The road ahead

The new Anti-Corruption Agency has ambitious plans to implement change. But it’s going to face some serious challenges. Zulfikor Zamonov, a lawyer working for the American Bar Association in Dushanbe, has said that the only way to overcome corruption is to restructure the administration and implement a system of checks and balances. Currently the judiciary and the parliamentary branch are entirely at the whim of the Executive. “The judicial branch needs to be strengthened in order to check the executive and be able to efficiently try crimes related to corruption” he says.

It makes sense to be skeptical, because the government often initiates reform projects as a way to legitimize its power, particularly in the eyes of Western donors. Nargis Nurrulokhoja, the chief technical advisor for the Transparency and Accountability project at UNDP says it is too early to determine the effects of the Anti-Corruption Agency. She says that the success of the Agency “depends on the skillfulness of the head. And it is right to say that the head of Agency is intelligent and quick enough to react on developments”. But its success will also depend on the capacity to find qualified staff – a task that is not easy in a country with a brain drain and an inadequate education system. Nurrulokhoja also mentions that the government may use the Agency as an opportunity to “bow to the West and give the image that they are a forward-thinking administration”.

It may be too hasty to assume that anti-corruption noises made by the authorities signify real reform. At root of the problem are societal differences which make it difficult to attain a society free of corruption as judged according to the standards of western donors. An informal decentralized economy means is it unlikely that any strategy will be able eliminate corrupt acts related to clan loyalties in the near future.

A great deal of the petty corruption is a result of the poverty and lack of basic services. An ineffective state leads to further dependency on clan networks. To battle corruption in Tajikistan on all fronts it is necessary to create a new generation of educated Tajiks who are not bound by the clan politics that dominated the Soviet era and played a part in the civil war. To win the war against corruption in the long term, this is where the efforts of Western organizations should be directed.

Livia Paggi is a graduate of Columbia University’s Department of Political Science. She has worked in Tajikistan on the American Bar Association’s Central European And Eurasian Law Initiative and for UNDP.